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In  response  to  recently  growing  literature  investigating  the  relationship  between 
environment and institutions, this study investigates how rule of law influences the 
level of income at the turning point of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Using 
an alternative specification of EKC that avoids nonlinear transformation of potentially 
nonstationary regressors, investigated by Bradford et al. (2005) and Leitão (2010), we 
find the evidence for the EKC in European countries for carbon emissions. Our results 
find a negative relationship between pollution and rule of law, demonstrating that when 
rule of law is strong, the turning point of the EKC occurs at a lower level of income per 
capita, thus, decreasing emissions. In terms of policy implication, our study suggests 
that  institutional  reinforcement  should  deserve  close  attention  in  designing  and 
enforcing policies that limit environmental degradation. 
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A constantly increasing body of literature is providing evidence regarding importance 
of institutions in environmental issues (Panayotou 1997, Torras and Boyce 1998, López 
and Mitra 2000, Dasgupta et al. 2001, Damania et al. 2003, Dinda 2004, Cole 2007 and 
others).  As  argued,  the  institutional  approach  offers  important  implications  for 
environmental studies and analytical frameworks for their study (Paavola and Adger 
2005). This is due to two interdependent reasons. First of all, environmental issues are 
rarely managed without state intervention and, therefore, must comply with regulation. 
At the same time, state regulation strongly depends on the strength of the institutional 
context  of  a  society.  This  implies  that  environmental  governance  involves  the 
establishment and enforcement of institutions. 
Although  the  number  of  studies  on  the  environment–institutions  relationship  is 
constantly increasing, studies analyzing the impact of institutions on environment issues 
is  far  from  exhaustive.  In  one  of  the  most  frequently  analysed  concepts  such  as 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), institutions also start playing an important role.  
The EKC, named after Kuznets (1955), emerged within the environmental context 
in the early 1990s with a seminal paper, stating that environmental degradation first 
increases and then falls beyond a certain level of per capita income (turning point). A 
large body of empirical literature analysing the existence and the shape of the EKC,   2 
apart from the classical relationship between polluters and income, considers among the 
regressors  other  variables,  which  influence  environmental  quality,  such  as 
macroeconomics  conditions,  industrial  development,  resources  availability  etc. 
Institutions are also often incorporated in such schemes (Bhattarai and Hammig 2001, 
Yandle 2004, Cole 2007, Culas 2007). However, there is very scarce empirical evidence 
showing the influence of institutions on the position of the turning point of EKC (for 
the  discussion  see  Yandle  2004).  To  our  knowledge,  studies  in  this  field  mostly 
concentrate upon the role of weak institutions, such as corruption mechanism (López 
and Mitra 2000, Cole 2007, Leitão 2010). In this paper, we propose to analyse the 
impact of institutional stringency, i.e. of the rule of law on the turning point of the EKC.  
Rule of law should be considered one of the institutions that plays a crucial role in 
environmental  issues,  given  that  environmental  controls  almost  always  depend  on 
regulation and are rarely adopted without regulation stimulus. The EKC provides an 
ideal context for demonstrating the importance of the rule of law on the position of the 
turning point whereby a more rigorous reinforcement of rule of law leads to a lower 
level of income at turning point, thus decreasing the level of pollution. 
To test this hypothesis we apply the parametric specification of the EKC introduced 
by Bradford et al. (2005). This approach avoids nonlinear transformations of potentially 
nonstationary variables, such as quadratic or cubic forms of income, often utilised to 
capture the inverse U–shape which may constitute a robustness problem for panel data. 
Moreover, following the approaches presented by Welsch (2004) and Cole (2007), we 
incorporate and identify both the direct effects of the rule of law on pollution and its 
indirect effects on pollution through per capita income. The data we utilise for the 
analysis include a panel of carbon emissions for 28 European countries from 1996 to 
2008. 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  two  examines  the  literature  on  the 
relationship  between  environment  and  institutions  within  the  EKC  context.  Section 
three outlines the applied methodology. Section four describes the data utilised, section 
five presents the results while section six concludes. 
 
 
2. Backgrounds for EKC and institutions 
 
The degree of institutional development is demonstrated to have a significant impact on 
environmental  issues  (Panayotou  1997).  The  literature  examining  the  links  between 
institutions and environmental quality within the EKC context is quite well developed. 
At the theoretical level, Brock and Taylor (2003) and Yandle (2004) have demonstrated 
the incidence of the institutions on the income–pollution paths and on the turning point 
of the EKC and have shown the importance of institutional enforcement on pollution 
abatement.  
At empirical level, some institutions or their sets are taken into consideration when 
investigating the existence and the shape of the EKC. Corruption is one of the most 
analysed institutional issues that expands the classical form of the EKC. López and 
Mitra (2000) and Leitão (2010) have demonstrated that in the presence of corruption, 
the turning point occurs at a higher level of income per capita. Institutions such as 
political liberties and civil rights incorporated among regressors weaken the income 
effect in the EKC hypothesis (Torras and Boyce 1998, Bhattrai and Hammig 2001). 
Democracy is found to contribute significantly to flatten the EKC for different polluters   3 
(Torras  and  Boyce  1998,  Frankel  and  Rose  2002).  Secure  property  rights  are  also 
important in achieving an earlier turning point on the EKC (Culas 2007). The above 
studies  therefore  indicate  that  enforced  institutions  can  reduce  environmental 
degradation at lower per capita income and accelerate improvements at higher income 
levels, reducing environmental price of growth (Panayotou 1997).  
Although  the  rule  of  law  is  one  of  the  important  institutions  for  environmental 
issues, it has not been widely considered in the empirical literature of the field with only 
a few studies on the EKC incorporating the rule of law. Panayotou (1997) utilises a 
composed index of institutions that includes rule of law, proposed by Knack and Keefer 
(1995), demonstrating that a better institutional enforcement contributes to flatten the 
EKC for sulflur dioxide emissions. Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) utilized the Freedom 
House  civil  liberty  index  incorporating  the  rule  of  law  and  demonstrated  that 
institutional improvements significantly reduce the degree of deforestation.  
We argue that further discussions on the role of rule of law in environmental issues 
is required. In fact, in cases where the market has to comply with state regulations, such 
as in the case of pollution abatement, favourable economic institutions in the form of 
rule of law represent the background for functional policies. Our model investigates the 
influence of rule of law on the position of the turning point of the EKC and considers 
the direct and indirect effects that rule of law plays on carbon emissions, one of the 
most  important  greenhouse  gases.  Following  Welsch  (2004)  and  Cole  (2007),  we 
analyse the linkages between rule of law and carbon emissions, that constitutes a direct 
effect of rule of law on environment while the indirect effect through which rule of law 
influences pollution is its impact on income. In fact, extended empirical literature find 
that stronger rule of law enhances economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1995, Dollar 
and Kraay 2000, Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2006 and others). By influencing income 
per capita, rule of law is expected to influence pollution levels and, thus, the position of 
the EKC. 
Here, we investigated the effect of rule of law on carbon emissions, one of the 
primary polluting greenhouse gases. Around 80% of the world's energy demand is met 
by fossil fuels (Energy Information Administration, 2004), leading to the substantial 
release  of  carbon  emissions  into  atmosphere.  A  large  strand  of  empirical  literature 
concentrates on carbon emissions and on their abatement. Many studies confirm the 
existence of the EKC for this polluter in various countries (Selden and Song 1994, Hil 
and Magnani 2002, Cole 2003, Friedl and Getzner 2003, Galeoti et al. 2006, Müller–
Fürstenberger and Wagner 2007, Dutt 2008, Atici 2009, Lipford and Yandle 2010). 
While Most of these studies have found the existence of an inverse U–shape curve for 
carbon emissions, some have found that the EKC may have an N–shape form (Cole 
2003, Friedl and Getzner 2003) or an inverted U–shape with rising tails (Lipford and 
Yandle 2010) which can be due to Golkany’s (1999) effect where these forms of the 
EKC arise due to unsustainable environmental protection costs. 
In estimating the existence and the shape of the EKC, most studies utilise different 
functional forms, such as linear, squared, and cubed equations. Although very diffuse, 
these approaches is criticised in the literature (Stern 2004, Bradford et al. 2005, Wagner 
2005, Müller–Fürstenberger and Wagner 2007) due to the problems arising in presence 
of nonstationary variables, such as, for example, income per capita. The fact is that, in 
introducing  a  non–linear  trasformation  of  nonstationary  processes,  it  is  not  always 
appropriate to utilise a linear unit root estimation (Stern 2004). The asymptotic theory 
of nonlinearly transformed integrated variables, in fact, has not been yet developed for   4 
panel  data  (Bradford  et  al.  2005).  Another  problem  that  derives  from  unit  root 
nonstationarity is that of the presence of cross–sectional dependence. To avoid these 
problems,  an  alternative  parametric  specification  of  the  EKC  was  introduced  by 
Bradford et al. (2005). Following this approach a change of pollution is introduced as a 
function of the growth rate and the distance of income to the turning point. As an 
extension to this approach Leitão (2010) introduces corruption and investigates the role 
that it plays on income and pollution. Following this approach, we analyse the incidence 
of the rule of law on the turning point of the EKC for carbon emissions.  
This study thus aims to evaluate whether EU countries have the EKC for carbon 
emissions and if so, determine the impact of the rule of law on the turning point beyond 
which  economic  growth  improves  environmental  quality.  In  addition,  we  also 
investigate  the  impact  of  other  factors,  such  as  manufacturing  concentration, 
international trade and other country-specific factors on carbon emission levels. The 
main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  demonstrate  the  importance  of  rule  of  law  in 
limiting environmental degradation by considering the direct and indirect effects that 
this institution plays on pollution. The key feature differentiating our study is also the 
incorporation  of  rule  of  law  into  the  EKC  by  utilising  the  alternative  parametric 
approach  described  by  Bradford  et  al.  (2005).  Finally,  our  findings  highlight  the 
importance of institutional enforcement for environmental preservation and contribute 





In order to avoid the use of nonlinear transformation of nonstationary regressors, such 
as GDP per capita, in panel data estimation, we refer to an alternative specification of 
the EKC proposed by Bradford et al. (2005). This approach consists of representing the 
EKC based on the relationship between the rate of change of pollution, per capita GDP, 
and the growth rate of per capita GDP at a given point in time: 
 
   
   = 𝗼 𝑦 − 𝑦∗ 𝑔                 (1) 
 
Therefore, the change of pollution (𝑃) is a function of the growth rate of GDP (𝑔) 
and of the distance from the turning point of EKC (𝑦∗). In the case where the coefficient 
𝗼 is negative, and 𝑔 is positive, 𝑃 increases until 𝑦∗ is reached and decreases after the 
turning point. A negative sign of 𝗼 thus indicates the presence of the inverse U–shaped 
relationship between pollution and GDP per capita. Country subscripts 𝑖 are omitted for 
the sake of simplicity. 
Given that our scope is to check for the impact of the rule of law on the turning 
point of the EKC, we suppose that the turning point 𝑦∗ is a function of the degree of 
rule  of  law.  Following  Leitão  (2010),  rule  of  law  is  introduced  in  equation  (1)  as 
follows: 
 
𝑦∗ = 𝗿  + 𝗿 𝑅𝑜𝑙                 (2) 
 
where 𝑅𝑜𝑙 is the average degree of rule of law over a sample period for each country. 
When 𝗿  < 0, higher degree of rule of law implies lower level of GDP per capita in the   5 
turning point 𝑦∗. 
The  equation  to  estimate  is  obtained  by  integrating  with  respect  to  time,  the 
combination of equations (1) and (2) while keeping income, average growth rate and 
average degree of rule of law as constants: 
 
𝑃  = 𝜇 + 𝗼 𝑦 − 𝗿  + 𝗿 𝑅𝑜𝑙 𝑔𝑡            (3) 
 
where 𝜇 is an integration constant.  
For empirical applications, equation (3) is written in the following reduced form: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃   = 𝜇  + 𝗽  𝑦 𝑔 𝑡 + 𝗽  𝑔 𝑡 + 𝗽  𝑅𝑜𝑙 𝑔 𝑡 + 𝗽 𝑍   + 𝜀      (4) 
 
where the countries are indexed by 𝑖 and time by 𝑡. 𝑃   is the carbon emissions per 
capita, 𝑦  is the average real per capita GDP, 𝑔  is the average real per capita GDP 
growth and 𝑅𝑜𝑙  is the average of the degree of the rule of law, all measured over the 
sample period. 𝑍   refers to a set of additional variables that has impact on carbon 
emissions,  such  as  energy  consumption,  manufacturing  share  in  GDP,  population 
density and international trade. 
We suppose that 𝑅𝑜𝑙  not only influences pollution level and the turning point of the 
EKC, but also a country’s income, which is a component of the EKC regression. In 
order to capture the indirect effect that rule of law has on carbon emissions, the first 
step is to estimate the following growth equation: 
 
𝑌    = 𝜆  + 𝜏  + 𝗾 𝑅   + 𝗾 𝑋   + 𝜀              (5) 
 
where real GDP per capita (𝑌   ) is expressed as a function of the rule of law (𝑅  ) and 
(𝑋  )  is  a  matrix  of  other  regressors  that  affect  income.  According  to  the  literature 
regarding economic growth, this matrix consists of typical variables such as capital 
stock per worker, level of education and share of trade in GDP. 𝜆  and 𝜏  correspond 
respectively to unobserved country–specific effects and year–specific effects. From the 
equation (5) we evaluate 𝗾  to obtain the impact the rule of law has on real GDP per 
capita. 
Average  values  𝑦   and  𝑔   are  obtained  from  equation  5  by  using  interpolation 
techniques after having calculated the fitted values of 𝑌   . Following Bradford et al. 
(2005), we compute the average value of per capita GDP of the first (denote by 𝑌  
 ) and 
the latest (denote by 𝑌  
 ) four year period of the total of GDP series for each country. 
The average growth rate 𝑔  is obtained from the following equation: 
 
𝑌  
  = 𝑌  
 exp (10𝑔 )                (6) 
 
while 𝑦  is computed as: 
   
𝑦  = 𝑌  
 exp (5𝑔 )                 (7) 
 
i.e. 𝑦  and 𝑔  are interpolated values at the sample mid–point.  
In estimating equation (4) we utilise the above interpolated values and a simple 
average of the degree of rule of law (𝑅𝑜𝑙 ) over the sample period. In doing so, we   6 
address the direct and indirect effects that rule of law plays on the level of carbon 
emissions and on the turning point of the EKC.  
 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Data used in this analysis was obtained from a panel of 28 countries from 1996 to 2008 
for a total of 392 observations. To estimate Equation 5 we divide countries into three 
groups. The First group (G1) includes European countries with strong industrial and 
service  sectors,  such  as  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Luxemburg,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden  and  United  Kingdom.  Countries  with 
substantial  part  of  the  regions  that  present  retard  in  industrial  and  service  sectors 
development constitute the second group (G2): Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal and Spain. Former socialist countries with restructuring industrial sectors and 
developing service sectors belong to the third group (G3): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Such a 
division is necessary to capture how diversified production and economic conditions 
affect income and environment.  
Carbon emissions are measured through total tons of carbon monoxide (CO) gas 
released by industries and households. The data is taken from Eurostat (2010). The 
index of rule of law is provided by Kaufman (2010) and is measured in units ranging 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better quality of this institution. 
Data on rule of law is available since 1996, which was considered the first year of our 
study. Other regressors utilised to estimate the EKC, such as electricity production from 
coal,  share  of  manufacturing  in  GDP,  population  density  and  share  of  exports  and 
imports in GDP were taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). 
These explanatory variables were chosen on the basis of existing literature in this field 
(Dinda  2004,  Bradford  2005,  Atici  2010  and  Leitão  2010).  These  indicators  are 
frequently utilised for evaluating economic activity that leads to production of carbon 
emissions. In fact, electricity production and manufacturing have a direct impact on 
greenhouse gases (Dinda 2004, Leitão 2010). While international trade and population 
density, which may indirectly influence emission intensity may have both positive and 
negative effects on pollution. If import prevails over export it may decrease emissions, 
since the production processes take place overseas. Population density may also have 
both effects on pollution (Bhattarai and Hamming, 2001). Negative impact, in fact, is 
noted because densely populated countries use less energy for transportation per capita 
than do more sparsely populated countries (EIA 2010). Positive effects on pollution, 
can,  on  the  other  hand,  be  due  to  more  intense  consumption  of  household  and 
production energy.  
In estimating equation 5 that addresses the indirect effect of rule of law through 
income level and income growth, we utilised data on real per capita GDP, capital per 
worker,  education  and  share  of  export  and  import  in  GDP,  taken  from  World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). The analysis is based on an unbalanced 
panel data, given that some observations are not available. Description sources of data 
of the used variables are summarised in Table 1, while in Table 2 sample summary 
statistics are presented. 
Estimation  results  of  equation  5  are  summarised  in  Table  3.  A  possible  bias 
resulting from endogeneity between rule of law and income per capita emerged from   7 
the estimation. To address this problem, rule of law was instrumented by (i) the fraction 
of population that speaks English as a mother tongue; (ii) the fraction of population that 
speaks one of the five primary Western European languages, including English as a 
mother tongue and (iii) the overall index of economic freedom (see Table 1). First stage 
regression indicates the validity of the instrumental variables we chose. The validity of 
the first two instruments was also confirmed by Hall and Jones (1999), Cole (2007) and 
Leitão (2010). 
It  is  important  to  note  that,  in  estimating  panel  data,  one  should  consider  the 
difference between fixed and random effect models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The 
effect  of  country–specific  characteristics,  potentially  correlated  with  the  dependent 
variable, can be explored by estimating both the fixed and the random effects models. If 
country-specific characteristics are correlated with the explanatory variables, the fixed 
effects should be preferred to random effects. Otherwise, random effects estimation is 
consistent and efficient. Equation 5 is estimated as the random effects model, given that 
introduced  time  invariant  instruments  prevent  the  potential  correlation  between 
country–specific effects and the explanatory variables. 
In estimating equation 4 (Table 5) it is very likely that the country’s unobservable 
characteristics can be correlated with income. This suggests that fixed effects estimation 
could  be  more  appropriate  than  random  effects  estimation.  In  our  case,  given  the 
significance of Hausman test statistics, the random effects model is rejected in favour of 
the fixed effects model. For this reason, for equation 4, we only report the results from 
the fixed effects estimation (Table 5). 
 
 
5. Results and Discussion  
 
Estimation results of equation 5 were used to obtain interpolated average values of per 
capita income and growth rate in order to calculate fitted values for the estimation of the 
EKC (equation 4). Equation 5 is estimated (Table 3) for the three groups of countries 
(G1, G2, G3) introduced in section 4. Given the presence of fitted values and following 
Leitão (2010), we do not express variables in naturals logarithms. In all estimations, 
rule of law is instrumented using 2SLS.  
Equation 5 was also estimated for the full sample. However, this approach did not 
prove  to  be  an  efficient  tool  for  the  EKC  estimation,  given  that  countries-specific 
institutional, and therefore, environmental characteristics could not be captured.  
As suspected, rule of law (𝑅  ) does not have the same impact on income across the 
three groups of countries. In G1 group the variable is significant and has a positive 
expected sign. In G2 group the variable has negative sign, being statistically significant. 
Nonetheless the presence of unexpected sign, we can attempt to explain this finding by 
considering the fact that during the analysed period, most of these G2 economies have 
worsened their institutional performance, thus drastically decreasing the rule of law 
index while increasing income per capita. In fact, the average rule of law index in G2 is 
1.1 while in G1 is 1.7. Probably, in G2 countries the negative effect of the worsening 
institutional context on growth was strongly counterbalanced by other more important 
economic factors. As expected, former-transition countries (G3) that present the lower 
average  value  of  rule  of  law  index  (0.57)  do  not  show  statistically  significant 
relationship between income and rule of law.    8 
Capital per worker affects income positively and significantly. The variable 𝐸𝑑𝑢 is 
also positive and significant in all countries except for G2. The share of exports and 
imports in GDP (𝑋𝐼𝑀𝑠ℎ) is also influencing income positively and significantly. These 
results are robust across all the alternative specifications.  
The relevance of instruments is tested at the first step of regression (Table 4). All 
instruments are significant at least in one regression. Variable 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐 – fraction of a 
country’s  population  that  speaks  English  as  a  mother  tongue  is  not  present  in  the 
regression  for  former-transition  countries,  given  that  it  is  invariant  over  the  sample 
period. Moreover, the Wald test is significant in all estimations. Other variables, such as 
distance from the equator, dummy for legal origin of each country and others were 
added as instruments in the regression but these instruments did not prove to be valid 
and the obtained results did not change. 
Table 5 provides the estimation results for equation 4. A basic regression of the 
EKC  that  involves  𝑦𝑔𝑡,  𝑔𝑡  and  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑔𝑡  (see  section  3)  was  first  estimated  with  no 
additional explanatory variables (𝑍). Models from (𝑌𝑏) to (𝑌𝑒) add the percentage of 
electricity production from coal sources (𝐶𝑂𝐴𝐿), the share of manufacturing output in 
GDP (𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝑠ℎ), the country’s population density (𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠) and the share of export 
plus imports in the country’s GDP (𝑋𝐼𝑀𝑠ℎ). The Variables 𝑦𝑔𝑡, 𝑔𝑡 and 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑔𝑡 are 
significant  with  expected  signs  in  all  specifications  of  the  model.  The  negative 
coefficient of 𝑦𝑔𝑡 indicates the presence of the EKC for carbon monoxide emissions in 
European  countries.  The  negative  sign  on  𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑔𝑡  demonstrates  the  existence  of  the 
inverse  relationship  between  the  strength  of  the  rule  of  law  and  the  intensity  of 
pollution. Moreover, the estimated value of 𝗿  is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating, in accordance to our theoretical model, that when rule of law is strong, the 
turning point of the EKC occurs at a lower level of income per capita. 
Surprisingly, the variable of Energy was found to be not significant in determining 
carbon monoxide emissions. On the contrary, manufacturing was found, as expected, to 
be a positive and significant determinant of carbon monoxide emission in Europe. In 
confirmation that European countries mostly import manufacturing goods from abroad, 
while exporting services, we found a negative and significant sign of the export and 
import variable. As for a country’s population density, this variable was significant with 
a negative sign, confirming the EIA (2010) hypothesis that sparsely populated countries 





In the light of the previous literature on institutional-environmental relationship, we 
consider the EKC under the lents of the rule of law institution. Our work adds to the 
previous institutional-environmental literature that investigates on the position of the 
turning point of the EKC (Yandle et al. 2004 and Leitão 2010) the analysis of the 
influence of rule of law on the income level at the turning point.  
Data covering a panel of 28 European countries for the period between 1996-2008 
were utilised to estimate a model examining the linkages between income per capita, 
carbon emissions and the state of rule of law. We find the existence of the EKC for 
carbon monoxide by applying the Bradford et al. (2005) approach that builds the curve 
avoiding nonlinear transformation of possibly nonstationary regressors, such as income 
per capita and thus avoids potential problems of robustness. The introduction of rule of   9 
law into the model follows the approach presented by Leitão (2010). Our analysis can, 
therefore, be seen as a robustness test for results presented by both Bradford et al. 
(2005) and Leitão (2010). 
We find that rule of law is negatively correlated with pollution and contributes to 
the achievement of an earlier turning point on the EKC, so that stronger rule of law 
corresponds  to  lower  threshold  income  level.  Our  findings  confirm  the  proposition 
advanced by Yandle et al. (2004) who argues that every point of the EKC is associated 
with specific institutional framework and reinforcement of institutions facilitates the 
race to the top of the curve.  
Moreover, we investigate the influence of rule of law on income level and on its 
growth, addressing the indirect effect of rule of law on carbon emissions. Our results 
confirm that the reinforcement of institutions plays a crucial role for the control of 
environmental  quality  and  has  important  implications  for  limiting  environmental 
degradation.  
Our  analysis  suggests  that  rule  of  law  enforcement  promotes  environmental 
protection and reduces the level of per capita income beyond which pollution declines. 
Turning  to  policy  implications,  the  empirical  model  provides  strong  evidence  that 
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Table 1: Data information 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Y  Real per capita GDP  WDI (2010) 
Kpw  Capital Stock per worker  WDI (2010) 
R  Rule of Law  Kaufmann (2010) 
Overallscore  Index of Economic Freedom  Heritage Formation and 
Wall Street Journal 
(2010) 
Eurfrac  Fraction of a country population that speaks one 
of the five primary Western European languages, 
including English as a mother tongue 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
Engfrac  Fraction of a country’s population that speaks 
English as a mother tongue 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
EDU  School enrolment, tertiary (% gross)  WDI (2010) 
XIMint  Share of exports + imports in GDP  WDI (2010) 
CO  Per capita carbon monoxide emission  Eurostat (2010) 
COAL  Percentage of electricity production from coal 
sources 
WDI (2010) 
MANUsh  Share of Manufacturing output in GDP  WDI (2010) 








Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
Y  24723.22  11987.3  5921.674  74421.63  363 
Kpw  8459.583  5676.116  374.5925  32710.88  352 
R  1.148901  0.580172  -0.193140  1.964045  364 
Overallscore  66.15247  7.229807  45.7  82.6  364 
Eurfrac  0.2444643  0.3945365  0  1.004  364 
Engfrac  0.0612857  0.2234402  0  0.974  364 
EDU   53.12494  18.25695  9.626324  94.88895  321 
XIMint  105.6177  50.04793  44.15393  318.2252  362 
lnCO   -2.534302  0.3779758  -4.087061  -1.780269  308 
COAL  3.020181  1.529222  -3.865139  4.573292  279 
MANUsh   18.72002  5.321808  7.463183  34.36443  326 
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Table 3: Estimation results for equation 5 
  G1  G2  G3 
R  9,252.85  -6,659.37  993.273 
  (4,661.173)*  (2,121.705)***  (1762.512) 
Kpw  1.404  1.557  2.013 
  (0.137)***  (0.167)***  (0.234)*** 
Edu  34.469  34.651  52.179 
  (20.879)*  (25.81)  (8.016)*** 
XIMsh  52.481  43.318  36.532 
  (11.664)***  (11.905)***  (7.301)*** 
Constant  -6,787.14  13,409.26  -106.849 
   (7379.95)  (2,288.912)***  (1346.251) 
Obs  119  70  122 
N. of id  11  7  10 
       
R–squared  0.776  0.828  0.844 
Wald χ^2  577.25  222.7  2242.27 
Prob.  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
           
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 4: First stage regression for equation 5 
  G1  G2  G3 
overallscore  0.0069  -0.00411  0.0094 
  (0.003)***  (0.005)  (0.003)*** 
Eurfrac  -0.2466  0.424  -4.854 
  (0.053)***  (0.077)***  (8.340) 
Engfrac  -0.0077  0.3562  … 
  (0.086)  (0.214)*  … 
       
Wald chi(6)  40  90  69 
p–value  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
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Table 5: Estimation results for equation 4 based on the models presented in table 3 
  (Ya)  (Yb)  (Yc)  (Yd)  (Ye) 
ygt  -0.000051  -0.000107  -0.000091  -0.000068  -0.000061 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
gt  0.571  0.956  0.857  0.538  0.619 
  (0.140)***  (0.158)***  (0.153)***  (0.165)***  (0.169)*** 
RoLgt  -0.919  -0.392  -0.412  -0.441  -0.498 
  (0.277)***  (0.254)***  (0.245)*  (0.238)*  (0.238)** 
COAL  0.0011  -0.003  -0.014  -0.023 
    (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
MANUsh    0.013  0.008  0.01 
      (0.004)***  (0.004)*  (0.004)** 
POPdens        -0.016  -0.016 
        (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
XIMsh          -0.187 
          (0.099)* 
Constant  55.708  62.275  54.174  51.302  45.049 
   (4.869)***  (4.540)***  (5.058)***  (4.841)***  (5.841)*** 
Obs.  286  244  235  229  229 
N. of id  26  23  23  22  22 
           
R–squared  0.41  0.56  0.57  0.61  0.62 
F–test  60.21  68.32  55.39  53.24  46.73 
Prob.  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
                 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 